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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
In Flewellen v. Randall, 74 S. V. 49, the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas holds that the naked possession of land,
to give the occupant title by adverse possession,
Sufficiency must be adverse to the entire world, including
the supposed owner; and, if it be not adverse as to him,
title will not be acquired, though it afterward appear that the
supposed owner had no title. Compare Converse v. Ringer,
24 S. W. 705.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
In Shuck v. Pfenninghausen, 74 S. W. 381, the Court of
Appeals, at St. Louis, Mo., holds that an attorney, in the
Action for absence of his client, when necessary, can ad-
Services vance legal costs and look to his client for re-
imbursement. The principle upon which the court so
decides is that this is within the implied authority of an at-
torney, since "it is every-day practice for an attorney in the
absence of his client, when it is necessary for the prosecu-
tion of the suit in hand, to advance legal costs for his client."
BANKS.
In Little's Administrator v. City National Bank of Ful-
ton, 74 S. W. 699, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds
Deposits: that where a decedent had money on deposit in
set off a bank at the time of his death, and the bank
held a note against him for a less amount, which matured
the day after his death, it was entitled to set off the amount
of the note against the deposit, and to pay the decedent's
administrator the difference. See also Matthewson v. Straf-
ford, 45 N. H. IO8.
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BIGAMY.
A perfectly logical holding, and yet one which on its face
seems somewhat anomalous, appears in Lane v. State, 34
Defence So. 353, where the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi holds that it is a defence to an indictment
for bigamy that there was a prior lawful marriage still exist-
ing previous to the first one alleged in the indictment, render-
ing it void. Apparently, therefore, it is safer to be married
three times than only twice.
CARRIERS.
The twofold aspect of the bill of lading appears in a some-
what new phase in Texas & P. R. Co. v. Kelly, 74 S. W.
Bill of 343, where the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
Lading holds that a final carrier, having accepted a ship-
ment for transportation from an initial carrier under a bill
of lading issued by the initial carrier, is bound by such bill
in so far as the same is a contract for carriage, but is not
bound by the admissions contained therein in so far as such
bill is a receipt for the goods shipped. See Evans v. Ry.,
56 Ga. 498.
Although the responsibility of a railroad for safe trans-
portation of the passengers on a freight train is not restricted
Passengers or lessened and the same degree of care is re-
on Freight quired in the manage.ment of such a train when
Trains carrying passengers as in the operation of a train
exclusively for passenger service, yet a passenger on a freight
train is charged with knowledge of and assumes the risks in-
herent in that mode of travel. Court of Appeals at St.
Louis, Mo., in Portucheck v. Wabash R. R. Co., 74 S. W.
368. See, in connection with this case, however, Indian-
apolis Railroad Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 296.
The recurring question as to which of two causes oper-
ative in bringing about a loss shall be deemed the proximate
Negligence: cause, is considered in the case of Hunt Bros. v.
Concurring Mo. K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 74 S. W. 69.
Cause In that case it appeared thaf wheat shipped by
complainant through the defendant railroad was damaged
and a part of it totally destroyed in an unprecedented storm,
which occurred while the wheat was still in the possession
of the railroad company. The railroad had been guilty
of negligence in failing to place the wheat on the proper
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elevator tracks promptly, so that it could be unloaded, and
in other ways, and but for its negligence the cars would
probably have been unloaded when the storm occurred. Un-
der these facts the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds
that the storm was the proximate and the company's negli-
gence the remote, cause of the injury to the wheat and the
company was not liable.
CHECKS.
The well-settled rule that a check payable to the order of
a fictitious person is payable to bearer is held by the Supreme
Payee Court of Michigan not to apply to the case
where a check was executed by drawing a line
through the blank for the insertion of the name of the payee.
The court decides that such a check is not payable to bearer
or to an impersonal payee, but is void for want of a payee.
Two judges dissent. Gordon v. Lansing State Savings
Bank, 94 N. W. 741. Compare McIntosh v. Lytle, 26 Minn.
336-
CONFESSIONS.
The general rule that a confession is, by itself, not suf-
ficient to establish the guilt of a prisoner seems well settled.
corpus The Supreme Court of Missouri recognizing this
Delitl rule holds, in State v. Coats, 74 S. W. 864, that
to warrant a conviction, the body of the crime need not be
absolutely proven independent of the confession, but if with
the extrajudicial confession such other facts and circum-
stances are given in evidence fully corroborating the con-
fession as to the corpus delicti, this is enough.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
A statute of Mississippi, passed in 1898, provided that
every employee of any corporation should have the same
Employers' rights and remedies for an injury suffered by
Ltability Act him from an act or omission of the corporation
or its employees as are allowed by law to other persons not
employees, where the injury results from the negligence of
a superior agent or officer or of a person having a right to
control or direct the services of the party injured, and also
when the injury results from the negligence of a fellow-
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servant and that knowledge of defective appliances and so
on shall constitute no defence. The Supreme Court of the
state, dealing with this statute, holds in Ballard v. Miss.
Cotton Oil Company, 34 So. 533, that the act is unconsti-
tutional, since it imposes restrictions on all corporations
without reference to any differences arising out of the nature
of their business not imposed on natural persons, and, there-
fore, denies corporations the equal protection of the law.
This case presents a thorough discussion of the authorities
and principles involved.
CONTRACTS.
The question has frequently been mooted, whether the
rule of law that a contract is closed when a letter accepting
Acceptance an offer is deposited in the mail box, is based
by Mail: upon the general course of business, or the im-
Right of plied permission to accept in that manner when
Rcl the offer is made by mail. This question is at
issue in Scottish-American Mortgage Company v. Davis,
74 S. W. 17, where the following facts appear: The de-
fendant submitted a proposition in writing for a sale of
land to the plaintiff as its agent to be submitted by him to
a proposed purchaser, who rejected the same and returned it
in a modified form to the defendant. The defendant, in
turn, added other terms and returned it to the plaintiff to be
again submitted to the purchaser. Sometime later, the pur-
chaser informed a friend that he would accept the proposi-
tion and authorized him to so advise the plaintiff, who im-
mediately wired and wrote his acceptance to the defendant.
The purchaser at the same time deposited a- letter in the
mails addressed to the defendant, notifying it of his accept-
ance, but intercepted the same by wire before delivery. The
Supreme Court of Texas holds that since the defendant's
proposition had not been submitted to the purchaser through
the mails, he had not implied authority to accept by mail
except by actual delivery of his acceptance, and the letter
deposited in the mails by the purchaser did not constitute a
binding acceptance on him, but he was at liberty to withdraw
the same at any time before its delivery to the defendant.
See, on the general questions involved, Dunlop v. Higgins,
I H. L. C. 397.
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In Hubbard v. Freiburger, 94 N. W. 727, the facts were
as follows. A paper read: "Return this coupon to
Public Policy dealer in buggies," etc., "with $15, for which he
will deliver to you a book with four of these
coupons. Sell these for $3-75 each, thereby getting your
money back. Each of those to whom you sell a coupon sends
to me, purchasing a book for themselves. When your four
coupons have been sent in . . . I have received $6o
and you will be entitled to $6o worth of merchandise at my
store and it costs you but $3-75 and a few hours' work sell-
ing the coupons. The right to redeem all coupons at any
time is hereby reserved and . . . parties holding them
shall be allowed the full value on the purchase price of any
article in my establishment. . . . Coupons will not be
redeemable in any other mannei than as above specified."
This contract, which finds its counterpart in many so-called
business transactions of the day, is held to be invalid as
against public policy, the Supreme Court of Michigan re-
garding it as on its face a contract impossible of perform-
ance ultimately. See McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich. 454.
DEAD BODIES.
The law with relation to rights in connection with dead
bodies presents a number of important phases. One of these
Collision with is dealt with in Hockenhazmner v. Lexington &
Train: Eastern Railroad Co., 74 S. W. 222. The Court
Damages of Appeals of Kentucky there holds that while
there is a legal right in the bodies of the dead which the
courts will recognize and protect, there can be no recovery
for mental anguish caused by the dead body of a relative
being thrown from a wagon by the negligent operation of
a railroad train in the absence of any injury to the body.
The opinion presents a careful discussion of the case and a
valuable collection of authorities.
EQUITY.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in
Haskell v. Sutton, 44 S. E. 533, holds that where a person
enters upon land without authority under a void
Jurlisicion lease and drills thereon, and takes petroleum oil
therefrom and removes the same from the premises and
threatens to drill other wells and to take the oil produced
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therefrom, a court of equity will perpetually enjoin him from
all operations under said void lease, will cancel said lease
and retain the cause for all purposes and proceed to a final
determination of all the matters at issue therein, although
the plaintiffs may have a remedy at law against the wrong-
doer for the trespass. One judge dissents, and the opinion
of the dissenting judge and of the majority of the court
present an excellent discussion of the question at issue.
EVIDP.NCE.
In a prosecution for aggravated assault, the defence was
that if the prosecutor when he fired the shot was wantonly
SImIlarFacts firing at the defendant's mother's dog, or if the
defendant believed that he and his mother were
in danger of their lives or bodily injury, he had a right to
shoot. Evidence was offered that the prosecutor had pre-
viously shot a dog belonging to the defendant's mother and
had been forbidden to come on the premises. The Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas holds in Coleman v. State, 74
S. W. 24, that this evidence should have been admitted as
tending to shed light on the defendant's conduct from his
standpoint.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
With two judges dissenting, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia, holds in Findley v. Cunningham,
Limitations 44 S. E. 472, that an executor or administrator
cannot make a new promise to pay a debt of his
decedent either before or after the debt has been barred by
the Statute of Limitations. See Thompson v. Peter, 12
Wheat. 565.
The Supreme Court of Iowa holds in Officer v. Offlcer,
94 N. W. 947, that where an executor makes a general de-
Funds In posit of money belonging to the estate in an ap-
Bank parently solvent bank, neither he nor his cestui
que trust is entitled to any preference over other creditors of
the bank merely because the deposit was a trust fund to the
knowledge of the bank.
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.
The voluntary conveyance by one against whom there is
a pending suit, of all his property to his wife and children,
Intent of is fraudulent and void as to the plaintiff in the
Grantor: suit, no matter what may have been the intent of
Tort Action the grantor: Court of Appeals of St. Louis, Mo.,
in McCollum v. Crain, 74 S. W. 650. Nor does it make any
difference that the suit is an action in tort. Compare with
this case, however, the English case of Ex parte Mercer, 17
Q. B. D. 290, where a man made a conveyance immediately
upon the beginning against himself of an action for breach
of promise of marriage, and the court held that the convey-
ance was not fraudulent. It will be remembered that in
many aspects the action for breach of promise of marriage
closely resembles a tort action.
INSANITY.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia holds
in Ward v. Brown, 44 S. E. 488, that evidence of physi-
erprt cians as to testamentary capacity is entitled to
Witnesses greater weight than that of non-professional
persons, provided they have had personal observation and
knowledge of the person whose mental capacity is in ques-
tion; otherwise it is not. Compare Jarrett v. Jarrett, ii
W. Va. 584. The case is a valuable case upon this question.
INSURANCE.
In Galvin v. Union Central Life Insurance Company, 74
S. W. 275, it appeared that the defendant insurance com-
Premiums: pany issued a policy on the life of the plaintiff's
Note: mother, stipulating that the failure to pay any
Forfeiture notes for premiums on the date they became due
should void the policy. At the time the application
was made the plaintiff's decedent offered to pay the first
year's premium; but the defendant's agent took her hus-
band's note instead without any conditions. The receipt was
delivered with the policy, stating that the first premium had
been paid and stipulating that it was subject to the condi-
tions of note given for premiums. Under these facts the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that as. the note was
given by a third person, a failure to pay it when due did not
forfeit the policy. See also the case of Moreland v. Union
Central Life Insurance Company, 104 Ky. 129.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds in American
Bicycle Company v. Hoyt, 95 N. W. 92, that a lessee
Destruction of under a lease which provides that in case any
Building buildings on the premises shall without any fault
of the lessee be destroyed or be so injured by fire or other
cause as to be untenantable, the lessee shall not be liable to
pay rent "until the same are rebuilt or repaired or he may
thereupon quit and surrender possession of the premises,"
who remains in possession of the premises after the destruc-
tion by fire, without his fault, of one of the buildings of the
premises, is not bound to pay rent until the lessor replaces
the destroyed building.
The same court holds in Atwill v. Blatz, 95 N. W. 99,
that where snow has been negligently allowed to collect on
Dangerous the roof of a building and it falls therefrom
Premises on a pedestrian on the sidewalk, the tenant of
the building and not the landlord is liable.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
In Noe v. Rapid Ry. Co., 94 N. W. 743, the Supreme
Court of Michigan holds against the dissent of two judges
Assumption that an employee of an electric railway company,
of Risk who was furnished with transportation on the
company's cars in going to and returning from work, did
not assume the risk of defective appliances in connection
with the track over which he rode on the ground that his
work was performed at a distance therefrom and he had no
duty calling his attention thereto.
MORTGAGES.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Beverly v.
Waller, 74 S. W. 264, that where the wife's name does not
Wido's appear in the body of a mortgage, her signature
Dower and acknowledgment of the instrument are in-
effectual to bar her right of dower. Compare Hatcher v.
Andrews, 5 Bush, 561. "The deed from X. purports no
conveyance of anything from his wife, nor even that she
was a party to it. Therefore it is as wholly insufficient as to
her as though she had never signed it."
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MUNICIPALITIES.
In Van Auken v. Garfield Tp., Finney County, 72 LPac.
2 11, the Supreme Court of Kansas holds that the obligation
Coverig resting upon a municipality, which is the legal
same successor of a former one covering the same
Territory territory, and which has received the assets of
such other, is neither "statutory" nor "implied," within the
meaning of those terms as used in the statute of limita-
tions, but is an obligation identical with that which rested
upon the original organization, and no right which a credi-
tor has as against the original municipality is less against
its successor.
NEGLIGENCE.
The lessor of a public toboggan slide which is defective,
or which fails to furnish proper protection to persons using
Lessor of it, is liable for injuries received by any one by
Structure reason of such defective construction. Court of
Appeals of New York in Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach
Imp. Co., 66 N. E. 968. See and compare Sutton v. Tem-
ple, 12 M. & W. 52, and Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana holds in Potts v. Shreve-
port Belt Ry. Co., 34 Southern, 103, that a company main-
Electric Wires taining electrical wires over which a high volt-
age of electricity is conveyed, rendering them
highly dangerous, is under the duty of using the necessary
care and prudence at places where others may have the
right to go to prevent injury. It must see to it that its wires
are perfectly insulated, and kept so, or else it must provide
adequate guard wires or other safety appliances, as means
of protection against the dangerous wires. See also Clancy
v. New York & Q. C. Ry. Co., 8i N. Y. Supp. 875, where
the doctrine res ipsa loquitur is applied to a similar case.
ROBBERY.
In Jones v. Commonwealth, 74 S. W. 263, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky holds that on a trial for robbery, an
Force instruction that if the defendant by stealth got
required possession of the money of the prosecuting wit-
ness by taking it from his person and before the defendant
had secured the money the witness discovered the taking and
by force attempted to regain possession of it, and defendant
by physical force prevented the witness from retaking it and
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either retained it himself or fraudulently transferred it to
another, it was a taking by force, was error, since to con-
stitute robbery the force or putting in fear must precede or
accompany the act of taking. See and compare with this
case the recent case of Dawson v. Commonwealth (Ky.),
74 S. W. 701.
SHERIFF.
. The Court of Appeals at St. Louis, Mo., holds in State v.
Dierker, 74 S. W. 153, that it is only such acts of a sheriff
Official Acts as are done under color of office, involving an
abuse as distinguished from a usurpation of au-
thority, that render his bondsmen liable. Consequently it is
decided that sureties of a sheriff on his official bond condi-
tioned for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office as
sheriff, are not liable for an arrest by him without warrant
for a misdemeanor not committed in his view, as such arrest
was not under color of office, although he thought he was
acting officially and was personally liable for his misconduct.
One judge dissents. Compare Warrensburg v. Miller, 77
Mo. 56.
TAXATION.
The statute law of Mississippi provides that every person
having money loaned in the state shall be taxable for it in
Loans by the county in which he resides or has a place of
Non-residents business or is temporarily located. Construing
this statute the Supreme Court of Mississippi holds in
Adams v. Colonial and United States Mortgage Company,
34 So. 480, that a loan made by a non-resident who has no
business, location or agent in the state, and which is obtained
by applications sent to the agent out of the state, is not tax-
able in the state, although negotiations for it are made in
the state, and although it is secured by mortgage on land
in the state, it being held that such mortgage does not give
the mortgagee an interest in land so as to make it taxable as
such. The case presents an unusually thorough discussion
of the points involved and contains an extensive citation of
authorities well considered. It is a valuable contribution to
the law upon this subject.
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TENANT.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Matthews
v. Hipp, 44 S. E. 577, that where payments were made under
Holding over an oral lease of the premises for a year, and thetenant continued in possession after the termina-
tion in law of the lease, he was a mere tenant at will and
there was no valid lease for the ensuing year, but that where
remaining in possession in this manner he paid rent that
accrued after the year and continued in possession of the
premises, the tenancy at will was changed into a tenancy
from year to year. See Tallano v. Spitzmiller, 12o N. Y.,
page 37-
WILLS.
In Meyer v. Weyler, 95 N. W. 254, the Supreme Court of
Iowa holds that where a testator bequeathed to his wife all
his property by a clause reciting that it was his
Repunany intention to make her his sole residuary heir and
legatee and to provide for her for the remainder of her life,
but that the devise was conditioned that whatever part of
the testator's estate might remain at the death of his wife
should go to their nearest relatives, that the devise to the
wife created an estate in fee in her and that the conditional
limitation after her death was void for repugnancy. See
Hambel v. Hambel, 1O9 Ia. 459-
The Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Rutledge
v. Fishburne, 44 S. E. 564, that where a testator devised
Construction: certain real estate to A. for life with remainder
Executory to her children, share and share alike, the chil-
Devise dren of a deceased child to take the parent's
share, a vested transmissible interest in remainder to the
child of the life tenant is created and all her children born
to her take by way of executory devise. Compare Ludding-
ton v. Kime, 9 Ld. Ray, 103.
In Indiana the statute law provides that, after the making
of a will by an unmarried woman, if she shall marry, such
Implied will shall be deemed revoked by such marriage.
Revocation In Hibberd v. Trask, 67 N. E. 179, the Supreme
Court of that state holds that this provision does not apply
where a married woman makes a will, and after that she is
divorced and then remarried. The similarity of statutes in
other states to that in Indiana renders the decision of more
than local interest.
